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Abstract
In this paper, we consider three U.S. public policies that potentially influence the work de-
cisions of mothers of infants—parental leave laws, exemptions from welfare work requirements,
and child care subsidies for low-income families. We estimate the effects of these policies on the
timing of work participation after birth, and on a range of outcomes in the subsequent four years,
using a group difference-in-difference technique suitable for analysis of cross-sectional data. We
find that the three policies affect early maternal work participation, but obtain no evidence of
significant consequences for child well-being.
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the consequences of three U.S. state policies – job-protected 
maternity leave, exemptions from welfare work requirements for mothers of 
infants, and child care subsidies for low income families - designed to affect how 
parents with newborns manage work and family. The first of these policies affects 
women employed prior to childbirth, while the other two are targeted to low-
income parents. Supported by research showing conditions in infancy have 
important long-term consequences for health, abilities, and skills (Shonkoff and 
Phillips 2000; Heckman and Masterov 2007), such policies are justified, in part, 
by the belief they benefit children, and expenditures on them are substantial.1  
Yet we know surprisingly little about whether work-family policies, in the 
form currently existing in the U.S., do yield such improvements. One reason is 
that we lack exogenous variation in policy ‘treatments’ – families that choose to 
make use of a policy are likely to differ from those that do not – making it hard to 
obtain causal estimates.  Second, it is difficult to obtain data allowing children’s 
developmental outcomes to be linked to the policies and conditions they 
experienced in the first year of life.  
This paper exploits two sources of variation in eligibility for these policies 
– geographical differences in state laws and individual-level differences in 
demographic characteristics – to identify plausibly causal policy effects. We 
combine state-level policy data with rich survey data from the Early Childhood 
Longitudinal Study Birth Cohort (ECLS-B) which provides high-quality 
assessments of cognitive outcomes as well as reports about children’s behavior in 
the year before school entry for a nationally representative sample of nearly 9,000 
children. The effects of work-family policies on children’s cognitive and socio-
emotional school readiness is of particular interest given the large racial, ethnic, 
and socio-economic disparities in such outcomes and the evidence that children 
entering school not yet ready to learn continue to have difficulties later in life 
(Rouse, Brooks-Gunn and McLanahan 2005).   
We begin our analysis by examining effects of the policies on maternal 
work participation during infancy. These estimates provide a clear test of whether 
our research design is powerful enough to isolate the expected effects of the 
policies on the child outcomes of primary interest. Moreover, changes in maternal 
work behavior in the postnatal period provide key mechanisms through which the 
policies might be expected to affect children. All three policies are shown to have 
1 For example, costs of the 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act, have been estimated to be as high 
as $21 billion annually (Mulvey 2005, although see Institute of Women’s Policy Research 2005), 
and spending on the Child Care and Development Fund child care subsidies reached $9.5 billion 
in 2000 (Gish, 2002). 
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significant and sizable effects on maternal employment during infancy in ways 
compatible with the specific incentives provided by each program.  
However, changes in maternal employment are not the only channel 
through which these policies may impact children, and the role of employment 
may depend crucially on how it affects other aspects of family life. Therefore, we 
explore a range of other factors hypothesized as possible mechanisms linking 
work-family policies, maternal employment, and child outcomes.2 Despite having 
strong effects on postnatal work behavior, we find that the policies had varying 
impacts on child care and small or nonexistent consequences for other parental 
inputs like breast feeding, number of health visits, maternal mental health, 
sensitivity of mother-child interactions, or subsequent household income.  
Finally, we present estimates of the consequences of the focal policies on 
school readiness. Overall, we find no evidence of policy effects that are either 
significant or even moderate in size, and our estimates are precise enough to rule 
out effects that would be economically meaningful. The preceding analyses 
provide some clues as to why this occurs. Although the policies induce large 
changes in maternal work behavior in the immediate post-birth period,  these do 
not translate into developmental differences, in part because they induce little or 
no change in family functioning or parental inputs. This presents something of a 
puzzle, given the large literature linking early maternal employment to child 
outcomes.  Potential explanations are that parents adapt behaviors to changes in 
work status such that children’s environments remain unaffected and that the U.S. 
policies are relatively limited in scope, particularly by the standards of many other 
OECD countries (Waldfogel, 2001, 2006; Ruhm, forthcoming).    
2. Related literature 
Relatively few studies directly investigate the question we focus on here, the 
relationship between public work-family policies and children’s cognitive and 
socio-emotional school readiness. Closest to our approach is the research of Baker 
and Milligan (2008, 2010a, 2010b), who analyze the effects of an extension of 
job-protected leave in Canada from six months to one year in 2000. Although they 
find that eligible mothers increased their time on leave by 3-3.5 months (from an 
average of 6 months pre-reform to an average of 9 months subsequently) and 
increased their time breast-feeding by more than 1 month, they find no evidence 
of policy effects on children’s health and developmental outcomes or family 
functioning assessed during the first two to five years of life.  Also relevant is a 
study by Baker, Gruber and Milligan (2008), who analyze the effects on a range 
2 The possibility that policies affect other aspects of family life besides maternal employment 
status, and that the effects of maternal employment are heterogeneous, argues against using a 
standard instrumental variables strategy (instrumenting employment with the policies).  
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of child and family outcomes of the introduction of a universal $5-a-day child 
care program for toddlers and preschool age children in Quebec. This study shows 
significant negative effects of the subsidy on the socio-emotional and health 
outcomes of children under the age of five; the authors point to a strong increase 
in maternal labor supply accompanied by deteriorations in parental health and 
relationship quality and more hostile, less consistent parenting as an explanation.3
These results suggest that the effects of work-family policies need not be uniform, 
as the details of the policies, the children they affect, and the counterfactual 
arrangements they displace may all differ.  
Four recent papers on European parental leave policies examine longer-
term outcomes of work-family policies for children. Dustmann and Schönberg 
(2008), Rasmussen (2010), Liu and Skans (2010), and Carneiro et al. (2010) 
exploit historical reforms in Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway 
respectively, linking adolescent and young adult education and labor market 
outcomes to policies in effect at the time of the individual’s birth. The first two 
studies do not find any evidence of policy effects on children’s outcomes; the 
third study finds no overall effects (although with some indication of benefits for 
children of well-educated mothers), while the fourth study finds modest positive 
effects on long-run educational outcomes (with these being largest for 
disadvantaged children).  But, for the most part, the reforms being examined, like 
the Canadian reform, extend time at home after the first few months of life, when 
the returns to parental time are likely the greatest.  
A larger set of studies explore the effects of work-family policies on 
outcomes besides school readiness. In terms of child health, Ruhm (2000) and 
Tanaka (2005) use country-level time series data to document a relationship 
between increased parental leave generosity and reduced post-neonatal infant 
mortality. Parental leave policies and infant welfare work exemptions have been 
causally linked to greater breast feeding (Baker and Milligan 2008; Haider, 
Jacknowitz and Schoeni 2003).  Several studies explore the effects of work-family 
policies on parental labor market outcomes. As Klerman and Leibowitz (1997) 
discuss, job-protected leave entitlements are expected to increase leave-taking but 
have ambiguous effects on work, primarily because some parents may choose a 
short job-protected leave rather than longer absences that require finding a new 
job. Most studies find that leave rights are associated with a lower probability that 
a mother works in the months immediately after a birth but with little if any effect 
on longer-term employment or earnings (Han et al. 2009; Hanratty and Trzcinski 
3 This finding is echoed in recent work on the U.S. child care subsidy program (Herbst and Tekin, 
2010; in press).  
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2009; Lalive and Zweimuller 2009).4  Conversely, child care subsidies lead to 
substantial increases in maternal labor supply (Berger and Black 1992; Blau and 
Tekin 2007; Lefebvre and Merrigan 2008) and welfare reform has been found to 
increase the employment of single mothers (Blank 2002; Grogger and Karoly 
2005).  However, few prior welfare studies focus specifically on mothers of 
infants and toddlers or explicitly examine infant work exemptions, which are 
among the most dramatic reform provisions.5  That said, the limited available 
research indicates that single mothers work more after a birth if they reside in 
states that do not exempt them from welfare work requirements (Hill, 2007). 
Although our main focus is on work-family policies, the large literature on 
the effects of early maternal employment on child outcomes is clearly relevant. A 
common finding of this literature is that first-year maternal employment is 
associated with lower cognitive test scores and higher levels of externalizing 
behavior problems, particularly for full-time work (Bernal 2006; Brooks-Gunn et 
al. 2002; Gregg et al. 2005; Hill et al. 2005; Ruhm 2004; Waldfogel et al., 2002).  
A number of intermediate factors have been identified that point to both positive 
and negative consequences of maternal employment. Berger et al. (2005) found 
that children whose mothers worked by 3 months were less likely to be breast-fed 
and breast-fed for shorter durations, less likely to be up to date on health visits 
and immunizations in the first year of life, and more likely to have behavior 
problems at age 3 or 4; these effects were particularly pronounced if mothers 
worked full-time.  Most recently, Brooks-Gunn et al. (2010) showed that maternal 
employment in the first year (particularly if full-time) has positive effects on some 
mediators (e.g. maternal earnings) and negative consequences for others (for 
example, increasing maternal depression), while having mixed effects on the 
quality of child care; as a result, the authors found that the overall effects of first-
year maternal employment on child developmental outcomes were neutral.   
3. Data 
As the only nationally representative birth cohort study in the U.S., the Early 
Childhood Longitudinal Study Birth Cohort (ECLS-B) provides unique 
information on the environments of infants and their families. The clustered 
stratified survey design sampled over 10,000 birth certificates and was designed 
to be representative of births occurring in 2001. Twins, low birth weight infants, 
Asian and Pacific Islanders, American Indian and Alaska Natives and Chinese 
children were oversampled; we use the survey weights in all our estimates to 
4 In a cross-country study Ruhm (1998) finds that parental leave rights increase relative female 
employment rates, but reduce relative female wages at extended durations. 
5 Before TANF, women were generally exempted from welfare work requirements until their 
youngest child reached 36 months of age. 
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correct for this. State of residence at child’s birth (taken from the birth certificate) 
was used to define the state policies relevant to each mother. 
A baseline interview was conducted when the child was nine months old, 
with follow-ups at 24 months of age and in the fall of the year before the child 
entered kindergarten.6 Each wave collected detailed information on the 
employment, demographic characteristics, lifestyles, and behaviors of parents, 
and on the early learning, care, and health experiences of children. A key feature 
of the ECLS-B is the wealth of information collected directly from children.  
Many assessments were adapted from well-known psychological scales, with 
rigorous field testing used to identify the most psychometrically sound items.7  
We use data from the first three survey waves, with most of our analysis drawing 
on the baseline information and the third (preschool) interview conducted when 
80% of the children were four years old. Seventeen percent of the original cohort 
members were lost between the baseline and preschool waves; this is explored 
below.    
4. Policies 
Parental leave. ECLS-B mothers gave birth in 2001 and so all were potentially 
covered by the 1993 federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) which 
provides 12 weeks of unpaid parental leave to employees working at least 1,250 
hours in the previous year for firms with 50 or more employees. Our research 
design relies on cross-sectional geographical variation, so the FMLA (and other 
federal policies) forms part of the baseline scenario against which the effects of 
discretionary state policies are evaluated. Although the FMLA is potentially 
universal in coverage, less than half of private sector workers meet the FMLA 
qualifying conditions (Waldfogel 2001).  As shown in Figure 1, fourteen states 
and the District of Columbia (covering 36% of sample mothers) had parental 
leave laws more generous than the FMLA in 2001.  This additional generosity 
occurs through relaxing FMLA requirements for firm size, tenure, or work hours 
(thus expanding the share of women covered, although still not providing 
universal coverage), offering longer durations of paid leave, or in five states, 
through temporary disability insurance (TDI) that provides a short (typically six 
week) period of paid leave (see Appendix Table A1 for details).8  
6 The final wave of the ECLS-B administered in the fall of the kindergarten year was not available 
at the time of our analysis.  
7 See http://nces.ed.gov/ecls/birth.asp for additional details.  
8 We exclude laws restricted to state government employees, as these cover only a small share of 
the workforce.  Han, Ruhm, and Waldfogel (2009) provide a detailed discussion of state leave 
laws. 
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Figure 1. State leave laws more generous than the federal minimum in 2001  
Our main analysis uses a binary indicator distinguishing states with or 
without any state leave law. This implies that we are estimating impacts of the 
“average” state leave law, rather than of possible specific aspects of it. As 
Appendix Table A1 illustrates, there is too much overlap in the different 
provisions across states to allow separation of the disaggregated effects but this 
also implies that the effect of the average bundle may be of considerable 
relevance. 
The intention of parental leave laws is to provide parents with a period of 
time when they can take leave from work after the birth of a newborn. We expect 
therefore that more generous leave laws will be associated with a greater share of 
women not employed and at work in the months immediately after the birth. The 
medium- and long-run effects are harder to predict; if women use leave and return 
to their pre-birth employers (rather than simply quitting their jobs to stay home 
with the baby), then long-run employment should be higher, but it is also possible 
that after a leave, women who might otherwise have stayed employed might 
develop a taste for being at home and long-run employment rates could be lower. 
Thus, the effects of leave policies are ambiguous, and depend on which specific 
groups of women are affected and in which direction. 
Welfare work exemptions. The federal legislation creating the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, in 1996, provided states with a 
high degree of flexibility in designing their cash assistance programs for families 
with children. By 2001 the vast majority of states imposed work requirements of 
6
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at least 30 hours per week and they were required to impose sanctions for non-
compliance.9  
Figure 2. State infant work exemptions 
Our analysis focuses on the age under which the youngest child must be to 
exempt a mother from work requirements.  Specifically, we create a dummy equal 
to one if the state exempts mothers from working during the child’s first 12 
months of life, or longer (27 states; 47% of sample mothers), and zero if the work 
exemption is less than 12 months.  Since 16 states had exemptions lasting exactly 
3 months, and 23 had exemptions lasting exactly 12 months, this seems like a 
sensible threshold. However, our results are robust to the use of cut-offs above 4 
or 6 months. Figure 2 shows the geographical variation in our binary exemptions 
indicator (see also Appendix Table A1). 
We expect that low-income women who are exempt from welfare work 
requirements will be less likely to work in the months immediately following the 
birth. The long-run effects on employment are unclear a priori.  
Exemptions are only one aspect of welfare generosity; other dimensions 
include the amount of cash benefits, time limits on receipt, and the stringency of 
sanctions for non-compliance. All of these are strongly correlated at the state 
level, limiting the certainty with which we can attribute any effects specifically to 
work exemptions. However, robustness checks, detailed below, provide some 
9 Full details of state policies prevailing in 2001 are available at:  
http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd/databook.cfm. 
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evidence that it is the duration of exemption from work requirements, rather than 
welfare policy more generally, that drives our results.   
Child care subsidies. Under welfare reform, child care funding for low-
income families was consolidated into an expanded Child Care and Development 
Fund (CCDF) block grant, with total state and federal subsidies increasing from 
$1.7 billion in 1992 to $9.5 billion in 2000 (Gish 2002). The CCDF allows states 
to serve families with incomes up to 85% of state median income (many states set 
lower thresholds) whose parents are working or in school. States determine child 
care reimbursement rates and parent co-payment rates but must offer a choice of 
child care types and providers. They can transfer up to 30% of their TANF block 
grant to the CCDF and may use remaining TANF funds to directly subsidize child 
care (usually through vouchers). A small amount of child care funding is also 
available through the federal Social Services Block Grant. 
Figure 3. CCDF spending per poor child under 6 in FY2000 (2001 dollars) 
We measure child care subsidies through a continuous variable capturing 
federal and state Child Care Development Fund (CCDF) expenditures in fiscal 
year 2000 (in 2001 dollars) per poor child under the age of 6.  The timing is not 
ideal since fiscal year 2000 ends in September (fiscal year 2001 data are not 
8
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measurement error. Figure 3 gives an idea of the geographical variation in child 
care subsidy spending, where for ease of presentation we group the continuous 
expenditures variable into low (<$1500), medium ($1500-$2500) and high 
(>$2500) categories (see also Appendix Table A1). 
The expected effects of more generous child care subsidies on low-income 
women’s employment and child care use are not entirely clear. Because subsidies 
are conditioned on employment, they should be associated with higher rates of 
employment and child care use among the target group. However, to the extent 
that subsidies are being taken up by women who were working already, they 
might not affect employment and might instead simply affect child care costs (and 
possibly child care arrangements, if families shift to more formal care in order to 
receive the subsidy).    
Policy combinations. Our analysis explores the effects of all three policies 
simultaneously and so allows for the fact that policies may be correlated across 
states. Table 1 investigates the degree to which this is the case. It shows where 
states fall in terms of the twelve different potential policy combinations that can 
be created from our indicators (treating CCDF spending as categorical). The fact 
that 11 of the 12 combinations are represented by observed state policies shows 
the policies do not co-vary deterministically. States with leave laws do tend to 
spend more generously on child care subsidies, but there are leave states in which 
CCDF spending is relatively low, such as Oregon and California.11  Welfare work 
exemptions, in contrast, are largely uncorrelated with the other two policies. 
11 With average CCDF spending of $1537, California falls just above the low CCDF boundary. 
available), whereas the oldest children in the ECLS-B cohort were born in 
January 2001. However, CCDF spending appears to be stable over this period (the 
correlation between state expenditures in FY2000 and FY2003 is 0.97) so the 
slightly lagged timing of the CCDF variable should not induce serious 
9
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Table 1. Summary of state policies 
Welfare work exemption >= 12 months 
State leave law CCDF spending Yes No 
Yes <$1500 (1) - (2) OR 
$1500-$2500 (3) ME (4) CA, HI, MT,  
NY, TN 
>$2500 (5) CT, DC, MA,  
MT, RI, VT 
(6) NJ, WI 
No <$1500 (7) GA, KY, LA,  
MS, NM, NV,  
SC, TX, WV 
(8) AL, AR, AZ, 
 ID, MI, ND,  
OK, SD, UT,  
WY 
$1500-$2500 (9) CO, IL, KS,  
MD, MO, NC,  
OH, PA, VA 
(10) FL, IN 
 >$2500 (11) AK, NH (12) DE, IA, NE,  
WA 
Note. CCDF spending expressed as thousands of dollars per poor child under 6 in 2001 dollars. 
5. Empirical strategy 
Our goal is to estimate causal effects of the state policies on a range of child and 
family outcomes. However, these policies are unlikely to be implemented 
randomly, but instead may arise from a complex interaction of geographical and 
historical circumstances, reflecting the economic and demographic composition 
and political preferences of the state population. Our focal policies may therefore 
be correlated with relevant confounding factors. A classic difference-in-difference 
(DD) strategy addresses this problem by comparing outcomes of individuals 
before and after the implementation of a policy, exploiting state variation in the 
timing and incidence of implementation. Lack of longitudinal variation in our 
birth cohort sample precludes the use of this strategy, and requires the adaptation 
of the conventional DD framework for a cross-sectional context. Although the 
assumptions of the “group” DD estimator we use are arguably stronger than those 
of the longitudinal version, our analysis has the advantage that the exceptionally 
rich nature of the ECLS-B data allow us to control for many sources of 
heterogeneity in a way that is not possible with more conventional longitudinal 
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datasets.  In addition, we show our results are robust to controls for a range of 
potentially confounding state policies and characteristics. 
Our estimation strategy relies on the assumption that each policy affects 
the post-birth outcomes of some mothers and children, while having little or no 
effect on others. Mothers ineligible for a policy form a ‘control’ group that is used 
to adjust for unobserved state-level heterogeneity, and so to infer the 
counterfactual outcomes of the eligible group in the absence of policy.  Our 
assignment of individuals to eligible and control groups is determined by broad 
socio-economic characteristics implying that some individuals in our treatment 
groups will not actually be influenced by the policies, while some in the control 
groups might be. This approach is necessary because of data limitations on exact 
program eligibility and to avoid endogeneity whereby fulfillment of the eligibility 
criteria reflects responses to the policy. The potential consequences of these errors 
are addressed below, but we note here that such misclassifications make it likely 
that our estimates understate the true policy effects.  We next describe the 
treatment and control groups for the three focal policies. 
When evaluating state leave laws, our eligible group includes mothers 
employed at some point during the 12 months prior to the birth (71% of sample 
mothers); those not so employed are the controls. Some women in the treatment 
group will not be affected by the state policies. This occurs because most state 
laws relax qualifying conditions for leave benefits (although longer leaves are 
also sometimes provided), implying that women already eligible under the FMLA 
gain no additional rights; the same is true for mothers remaining ineligible under 
the state laws or who are covered by more generous employer leave policies.14   
The treatment group when considering infant welfare work exemptions 
consists of women with no resident partner at the nine month interview, 
henceforth referred to as single mothers (20% of sample mothers). Two-parent 
families are technically eligible for TANF but rarely meet the income and other 
qualifying conditions (accounting for less than 4% of TANF families in 2001).15  
Although eligibility for CCDF payments is explicitly determined by 
income, we use an education-based treatment group to avoid the endogeneity 
problem whereby child care costs influence work and therefore earnings. 
Specifically, our treatment group contains mothers in families where no parent 
has a high school diploma (i.e. mothers without a high school diploma who are 
14 The DD estimates therefore represent the average ‘intent to treat’ policy effect over all mothers 
with a pre-birth job. A ‘treatment on the treated’ research design would scale these estimates by 
the proportion of that group obtaining new rights under the state laws.  We lack the necessary 
information on tenure, firm size, and employer policies to conduct such calculations with any 
precision but view the estimated ‘intent to treat’ effect to be of interest in its own right. 
15 This was calculated using data from : http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-
reports/caseload/caseload_recent.html [accessed July 16, 2010]. 
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single or reside with a similarly low-educated partner). Some of the control group 
will likely be eligible for child care subsidies. Nevertheless, since the subsidy 
amount is determined on a sliding scale (depending on family income), the 
incentives are likely to be strongest for the least educated households. We 
investigated the consequences of widening the treatment group to include more 
educated parents, and found that the positive labor supply effects of the subsidies 
on participation became small or non-existent, consistent with the subsidy-
induced work incentives being concentrated among the lowest income families.    
A threat to our research design is potential endogeneity of the eligibility 
conditions with respect to the focal policies. For instance, a common contention is 
that U.S. welfare rules encourage single headship, although empirical evidence 
suggests that state welfare policies do not substantially affect marital status 
(Hoynes 1997; Moffitt 1998); moreover, welfare rules penalizing marriage were 
abolished in 37 states, and weakened in most others, under TANF (Urban Institute 
2002). The assumption that child care subsidies do not strongly influence 
maternal education decisions seems relatively uncontroversial, although they 
might permit some young mothers to complete schooling (rather than entering 
employment). On the other hand, that state leave laws might affect the probability 
that a mother worked in the year before the birth seems more plausible, 
particularly for second and later children if leave laws increase long-term job 
retention and labor market attachment. The last two of these issues are explored 
further in our robustness checks.  
Our main analysis uses a regression version of the DD strategy to model 
the net effect of each focal policy, holding constant other policies and potential 
confounding factors. This matters because, as discussed, the three policies tend to 
be correlated across states.  Our estimating equation is 
ݕ௜௦ ൌ ෍൛ߛ௣ܧ݈ܾ݈݅݃݅݁௜௦௣ ൅ ߠ௣൫ܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௦௣ ൈ ܧ݈ܾ݈݅݃݅݁௜௦௣൯ൟ
ଷ
௣ୀଵ
൅ ௜ܺ௦ᇱ ൅ ߙ௦ ൅ ߝ௜௦ (1) 
where ݕ௜௦ is the outcome of individual i in state s; ܧ݈ܾ݈݅݃݅݁௜௦௣  a binary indicator 
equal to one if individual i is in the treatment group for policy p; ܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௦௣ is the 
value of policy p in state s; ௜ܺ௦ᇱ  is a vector of individual characteristics; ߙ௦ is a 
state-specific intercept; and ߝ௜௦ is an error term. 
The classic pre/post DD estimator for longitudinal data assumes a 
common time trend in the outcome across policy and non-policy states. In the 
cross-sectional group DD framework used here, the analogous assumption is that 
differences in outcomes between eligible and ineligible individuals would be the 
same across states in the absence of policy.  
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The inclusion of state-fixed effects in (1) captures the influence of 
unobserved state-specific factors equally influencing the eligible and controls 
groups. These fixed effects are a generalization of the basic DD framework that 
incorporates policy main effects (by substituting ∑ ߛ௣ܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௦௣ଷ௣ୀଵ  for ߙ௦ in 
equation 1), and remove the need to control for specific state characteristics such 
as average wage or unemployment rates. Hence the DD strategy allows levels of 
the outcomes to differ freely across states, in a no-policy world, but assumes that 
treatment versus control group differences are the same across policy and no-
policy states. This is a strong assumption that could be violated if there are 
systematic differences in the composition of the eligible and control groups 
between policy and no-policy states. Such heterogeneity could arise, for example, 
because states differ in their tastes for inequality and as a result target a range of 
services towards poorer families, not just the focal policies of interest.  
To shed light on the extent to which this assumption holds up in our data, 
we examined differences in mean characteristics between the eligible and control 
groups in policy and non-policy states for each of our three focal policies. 
Appendix Table A2 shows these eligible vs. control group differences for states 
with and without leave laws. For the most part, these differences in means are not 
significantly different, although some are (for example, mothers employed in the 
pre-birth period are 18.7 percentage points less likely to be Hispanic than mothers 
not employed pre-birth in states with leave laws vs. 12.9 percentage points less 
likely in states without leave laws).  Appendix Tables A3 and A4 provide 
comparable information for our analysis of welfare work exemption policies and 
child care subsidy policies respectively; again, the majority of differences in 
means are not significantly different across policy and non-policy states.  While 
these results are reassuring, we cannot rule out the possibility that some 
differences in outcomes would have occurred between eligible and control groups 
in policy and non-policy states even in the absence of the policies.   
To address this potential heterogeneity, we first use the rich individual-
level data in the ECLS-B to control for systematic differences in the relative 
composition of treatment and control groups across states. Available controls 
include standard demographic variables, information on the mother’s experiences 
in childhood and later life, health-related behaviors, and attitudes towards 
motherhood. We also include proxies for potentially relevant attitudes and 
behaviors although, when doing so, we are careful to exclude factors that are 
potentially affected by post-birth employment (such as breast feeding), since they 
might absorb a portion of the true policy effect.16  
16 The supplementary controls include: marital status/family type (4 variables), race/ethnicity (5 
variables), maternal education (4 variables), mother’s age at birth, number/age of resident siblings 
at 9 months (5 variables), mother is foreign born, mother’s primary language is non-English, 
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Second, we conduct robustness checks where other state-level policies and 
characteristics,	ܼ௦, are allowed to differentially affect the eligible and control 
groups. This is done by adding interaction terms ∑ ߜ௣൫ܼ௦ ൈ ܧ݈ܾ݈݅݃݅݁௜௦௣൯ଷ௣ୀଵ  to 
equation (1). The number of characteristics that can be included in a single 
regression is limited because there are only 50 states in the U.S., and many of the 
variables are collinear. Therefore, we only included variables that a priori might 
be expected to affect disadvantaged groups differentially: the state unemployment 
rate and percent of workers covered by a union; census region; democratic party 
representation in state politics; and transfer program provisions – non-refundable 
or refundable Child and Dependent Care (CADC) tax credits, refundable state 
Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC), and generosity of Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) and Food Stamp benefits for a family of three.  These are 
introduced into the econometric models sequentially (in four groups) to examine 
whether the estimated policy effects survive when outcomes of the treated groups 
are allowed to vary systematically with these variables between states. 
We use linear probability (LP) for our binary work participation outcomes 
because coefficients on the interaction terms are more straightforward to interpret 
than probit or logit estimates (Ai and Norton, 2003); however, marginal effects 
estimated from corresponding probit models were generally quite similar.  All 
estimates are weighted to adjust for disproportionate sampling, survey 
nonresponse, and noncoverage of the target population. The standard errors 
account for complex survey design.17 
6. Effects on maternal work participation  
We begin the empirical analysis by documenting effects of the policies on 
maternal work participation in the first nine months after giving birth. These 
results are both interesting in their own right and provide a useful check on the 
validity of our research design by allowing us to observe whether the timing of 
urbanicity (3 variables), father’s education (5 variables), maternal welfare receipt during 
childhood (2 variables), education of mother’s parents (4 variables), mother grew up in intact 
family, the mother’s number of risky life events (4 variables), pre-pregnancy BMI (5 variables), 
maternal smoking and drinking before pregnancy (4 variables), and desired number of children (2 
variables).
17 Standard errors, when clustered at the state level, are generally somewhat smaller than those 
reported in the tables, which account for stratum and primary sampling unit clustering. 
the estimated effects is consistent with the incentives created by the policies. 
Unfortunately, the second and third sweeps of the ECLS-B contain information 
only on current employment, and so do not allow us to construct detailed 
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indication of longer-term employment effects using the data available, however, is 
provided in the following section.   
At the baseline interview, mothers were asked if they had worked for pay 
during the last week and, if not working or on vacation/leave, whether they had 
done so since giving birth.  If the answer to either question was yes, they were 
asked how old the child was when they first went back to work. Using this 
information, we constructed ten dichotomous work participation variables 
indicating whether the mother had started work by the time the child was 0 
months old, 1 month old, and so on up to 9 months old. 18  Our multivariate 
analyses focus on three durations: work by child age two, four and nine months. 
The two-month cut-off is of interest because it is within the job-protected federal 
leave period mandated by the FMLA and the minimum infant welfare work 
exemptions in all but four states. Four-months is just after expiration of these 
provisions; the nine month threshold represents the end of the analysis period.  
Figure 4 shows the average work participation rates over the nine months 
for mothers giving birth in the U.S. in 2001; vertical lines mark the three 
employment outcomes used subsequently. 19 Fifty-nine percent of mothers had 
worked by the time their child was nine months old, 47% had worked by four 
months of age, and 28% by two months, a high proportion by international 
standards.20  Figures 5 to 7 illustrate our DD strategy for the three policies by 
summarizing average differences in maternal work participation between states 
and groups at durations up to nine months.  Appendix Figures A1 to A3 show the 
corresponding group profiles from which the difference estimates are calculated. 
Figure 5 examines state maternity leave laws. The two lines plot differences in the 
unconditional probability of post-birth employment between treatment and control 
groups of women in states with and without a leave law. The gap between the 
lines is the unadjusted DD estimate. Although both groups of mothers are less 
likely to work after birth in leave than non-leave states, there are clear differences 
between the treatment and control groups. The DD estimate is largest at two to 
three months (-6.9 and -6.3 percentage points), precisely when the leave 
18 When mothers answered in weeks, four weeks is treated as equivalent to one calendar month.  
19 See Han, Ruhm, Waldfogel and Washbrook (2008) for a detailed description of early work 
participation patterns in the ECLS-B. 
20 For instance, data from the Millennium Cohort Survey indicate that only 7% of UK mothers are 
at work within two months.  
employment histories beyond the first nine months of the child’s life. Some 
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that discourage early work. This DD analysis suggests that leave laws increase the 
probability of working from six months after birth and later, consistent with 
explanations where job-protected leave increases long-term employment 
continuity. 
Figure 4. Post-birth work participation rates in the ECLS-B cohort of 
mothers 
   
  
entitlements should have the strongest effects. Treatment group mothers in leave 
states resume work faster than their counterparts in slightly later months (>3 
months after birth), presumably as their leaves expire. Conversely, the gap among 
women in the control group (who did not work in the year before birth) becomes 
progressively larger over time, pointing to the role of other factors in leave states 
16
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Figure 5. Unconditional effects of state leave laws on the eligible and control 
groups  
Figure 6 plots the differences in the employment rates of single and 
married (or cohabiting) mothers in states with and without welfare work 
exemptions of ≥12 months. The differences are small for single mothers, but 
married women are more likely to work in states with lengthy exemptions, again 
suggesting that there are other forces in these states encouraging early work. As a 
result, the DD estimates – the difference between the two lines – suggest that long 
welfare work exemptions reduce the employment of single mothers.  Emergence 
of the disincentive effect at three months is notable, since this is when the work 
requirements take effect in 16 of the 24 states with short (<12 month) exemptions. 
Our policy indicator for child care subsidy expenditures is a continuous measure 
of federal and state CCDF expenditures per poor child under 6.   
In order to allow a graphical representation we plot the difference between 
mothers in states spending less than $1500 per year versus those spending $2500 
or more. These results, shown in Figure 7, demonstrate that women in low 
educated families are much more likely to work after birth if they reside in states 
with relatively generous child care subsidies, while their control group 
counterparts appear to be slightly less likely to work post-birth.  The DD estimate 
is substantial at all periods greater than one month after birth. 
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Figure 6. Unconditional effects of infant welfare work exemptions on the 
eligible and control groups  
Table 2 presents corresponding multivariate DD estimates, controlling for 
both individual-level characteristics and state fixed-effects.  The first three 
columns, showing findings for the full sample, indicate that the conclusions 
drawn from Figures 5 to 7 change little with the addition of controls. For instance, 
leave laws reduce the predicted probability of work by two months by 6.6 
percentage points (24% of the sample mean), after which the gap in work 
participation between  eligible women in leave and non-leave states falls sharply, 
becoming insignificant by four months post-birth. The association then reverses, 
such that leave laws increase the expected probability of employment at or before 
nine months by a marginally significant (p<.10) 4.3 points (7% of the sample 
mean).  This pattern points to notably greater initial leave-taking but with no 
negative effects on employment later in the first year, consistent with prior 
research on parental leave extensions (e.g. Han et al. 2009; Hanratty and 
Trzcinski 2009).  
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Figure 7. Unconditional effects of child care subsidy expenditures on the 
eligible and control groups  
The predicted effect of welfare work exemptions lasting a year or more 
emerges between two and four months post-birth, at precisely the time that short 
exemptions expire in 19 of the 24 control states.  Long exemptions decrease the 
probability of maternal employment at or before four months by 6.9 percentage 
points (15% of the sample mean), a reduction sustained intact to nine months after 
the birth (at which point it repesents 12% of the sample mean); this finding is 
consistent with the limited prior research on the employment effects of this policy 
(Hill, 2007).  Finally, an extra $1000 of spending on child care subsidies per poor 
child under age six increases post-birth employment of the treatment group by a 
modest 3 to 4 percentage points at all three periods of measurement. This result is 
not directly comparable to those in the prior literature (Blau and Tekin, 2007, for 
example report that being eligible for a subsidy increases employment by 13% 
whereas we are estimating the effect of an increase in state subsidy spending).  
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Table 2. Linear probability models of work participation after childbearing
A. Unrestricted sample B. Sample remaining at age 4 wave 
Mother worked by child age: Mother worked by child age: 
(1) 
2 months 
(2) 
4 months 
(3) 
9 months 
(4) 
2 months 
(5) 
4 months 
(6) 
9 months 
    
State leave law × -0.066*** -0.026 0.043* -0.078*** -0.037 0.044 
Worked before birth (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) 
[-0.108, -0.024] [-0.069, 0.017] [-0.003, 0.089] [-0.125, -0.031] [-0.087, 0.013] [-0.009, 0.097] 
     
Work exemption × 0.011 -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.021 -0.088*** -0.071** 
Single mother (0.025) (0.024) (0.021) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
[-0.039, 0.061] [-0.116, -0.022] [-0.110, -0.026] [-0.078, 0.036] [-0.145, -0.032] [-0.126, -0.015] 
     
CCDF spending × 0.040** 0.031* 0.035** 0.025 0.014 0.020 
No parent with HS (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.016) (0.017) 
[0.007, 0.073] [0.000, 0.062] [0.000, 0.069] [-0.019, 0.068] [-0.017, 0.045] [-0.013, 0.054] 
     
R-squared 0.150 0.246 0.252 0.149 0.251 0.253 
Mean of dep. var. 0.277 0.471 0.591 0.283 0.478 0.599 
Notes. Weighted estimates. Standard errors clustered for complex sampling design in parenthesis. 95% confidence intervals in square brackets. *** p<.01, 
** p<.05, *p<.1. Sample sizes are 10,500 for the unrestricted sample and 8,800 for the subsample remaining at the age 4 wave.  Regressions include state 
dummies, main effects of eligibility criteria (worked before birth, single mother and no parent with a high school diploma) and controls for: race/ethnicity; 
education of mother and partner at 9 months; mother’s age at birth and its square; parents cohabiting; other family type; number of previous children; other 
child age 2 or under in household; other child age 3 or 4 in household; mother foreign born; mother’s primary language not English; urban/rural; mother’s 
family received welfare in childhood; education of mother’s parents; mother lived with biological parents until 16; pre-pregnancy BMI and alcohol 
consumption; desired number of children; number of challenging life events; child sex; multiple birth status; normal/low/very low birth weight. 
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These results provide strong support for the possibility that we are picking 
up causal effects of the policies.  In particular, if the results were due to 
confounding factors, we would not expect to see the sharp discontinuities in 
behavior around the dates that policy entitlements begin or expire that we do 
observe. It is noticeable that there is no discontinuity in child care subsidy 
eligibility in this period, as there is for the other two policies, and that we 
therefore see no substantial difference in the DD estimates of the effect of this 
policy in the short window between two and four months. 
The last three columns of Table 2 checks the effects of restricting the 
sample to families participating in the preschool (age 4) wave of the survey, when 
we will observe the school readiness outcomes that are of ultimate interest. Doing 
so has little effect on the point estimates for leave laws and welfare work 
exemptions but the predicted magnitude of child care subsidies falls by a third and 
loses significance, suggesting that attrition is largest for those most affected by 
the subsidies. It is important to bear this in mind when interpreting our results in 
the following sections. 
Table 3 summarizes the results of a series of simulations examining the 
effects of combinations of the three focal policies.21 The estimates are constructed 
using the regression coefficients from columns 1 and 3 in Table 2, with the policy 
variables set to the specified values. We focus on participation rates by two 
months and nine months after birth.  Outcomes are predicted for each individual 
and then averaged over the relevant sample to yield the expected participation 
rate. As two of the three focal policies are targeted at disadvantaged mothers, we 
also show results for single mothers (20% of the population) and those with a high 
school diploma or less (49% of the population). 
Column 1 shows the predicted work participation rates under the policies 
prevailing in 2001 (the “status quo”). Column 2 provides corresponding estimates 
for a combination of policies designed to maximize work participation by nine 
months. This involves generous spending on child care subsidies (set to the 90th
percentile of the existing state distribution), the abolition of lengthy infant welfare 
work exemptions, and the implementation of universal state leave laws, a 
combination similar to that observed in New Jersey, for example.  The last of 
these choices is made because although state leave entitlements are predicted to 
decrease work immediately after birth, they are expected to increase it in the 
longer-term. The third combination is the reverse of the second, with child care 
subsidies set at the 10th percentile, state leave laws abolished, and all states having 
21 These estimates are calculated under the assumption that the policies have no effect on the 
control groups and that the treatment effects are uniform across states. We do not imply that these 
are the only policy combinations of potential interest. 
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an infant work exemption of at least 12 months (similar to the policies observed in 
Texas). 
Table 3. Predicted work participation rates at national level under 
alternative policy packages 
 Policy combinations 
(1) 
Status quo 
(2) 
Package to maximize 
maternal work by 9 
months 
(3) 
Package to minimize 
maternal time by 9 
months 
Policies Policies in effect in 
2001 
Leave  laws in all 
states; No welfare 
work exemptions 
≥12 months; 
CCDF spending at 
90th percentile 
($3,865) in all states) 
No state leave laws; 
Welfare work 
exemptions of 12 
months or more in 
all states; 
CCDF spending at 
10th percentile ($975) 
in all states) 
Predicted work participation rates by child age (in months): 
Sub-group 2 9 2 9 2 9 
All mothers 0.25 0.59 0.26 0.63 0.25 0.56 
High school or 
less 
0.28 0.52 0.25 0.58 0.29 0.45 
Single mothers 0.29 0.61 0.29 0.70 0.25 0.55 
Notes. Table shows average predicted probability of having worked for the relevant sample of 
mothers. Predicted probabilities are calculated using the regression coefficients shown in Table 2, 
columns 1 and 3. Policy variables are set to the specified values and the outcome is predicted for 
each individual before averaging. Calculations assume that the policies have no effect of the work 
probabilities of the control groups.
Switching from the most to least employment-promoting policy package is 
anticipated to reduce the overall proportion of mothers who have worked by the 
time their child is nine months old by 7 percentage points (from 63 to 56%).  
Since 4.026 million children were born in the U.S. in 2001 (Martin et al., 2002), 
this change would increase the number of infants with non-working mothers at 
nine months by around 280,000 yearly. Much stronger effects are predicted for 
less advantaged mothers. The estimated nine month work participation rate falls 
by 13 percentage points for mothers with a high school education or less 
(affecting roughly 250,000 infants annually), and 15 percentage points for single 
mothers (affecting 120,000 infants).  Notice, however, that the differences are not 
large for maternal work in the first two months after birth.  The reason is that long 
welfare work exemptions have no impact during this period, while child care 
subsidies and leave laws have off-setting effects. 
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7. Other influences on child development  
Effects of the focal policies on children depend not only on employment status, 
but also on how families are able to manage the twin demands of the labor market 
and child-rearing. For this reason we supplement our analysis of work 
participation with a range of intermediate factors that have been identified in the 
literature:  mode of child care at nine months, the health inputs of breast feeding 
and well baby visits, maternal mental health, sensitivity of mother-child 
interactions and other measures of parenting, and longer-run maternal 
employment and household income.  
We explore child care mode by distinguishing between three mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive categories of regular care at the date of the survey: 
parental care only (no regular non-parental care of any type); center-based care 
(day care centers, nursery schools, and preschools); and other non-center-based 
non-parental care (e.g. provided by relatives, babysitters, or other informal child 
care providers)22.  
Our breast feeding outcome is the duration in months (right-censored at 
nine months when the responses were recorded), although we also explored a 
range of alternatives (whether breast feeding was ever initiated, and whether it 
lasted beyond two, six, or nine months). An additional health-related behavior 
analyzed is the number of well-baby visits (for check-ups and vaccinations). Here 
we focus on the relatively extreme binary outcome of less than 4 visits by nine 
months (13% of the sample), as we expect the costs of failure to attend these key 
initial visits to be the highest. 
Our measure of maternal mental health is obtained from the Center for 
Epidemiological Studies’ Depression Scale (CES-D), a well-known 12-item self-
completed checklist of depressive symptoms. Items are summed and normalized 
to a z-score (with mean zero and standard deviation one), such that the 
coefficients of interest can be interpreted as effect sizes. 
A unique feature of the ECLS-B is its direct observation and high-quality 
measures of the sensitivity and responsiveness of maternal parenting behavior 
obtained through the Nursing Child Assessment Teaching Scale (NCATS), 
administered at nine months, and the Two Bags assessment, administered at four 
years. Both assessments are obtained from video-tapes made of the mother and 
child engaging in a semi-structured task (like playing with various toys) for 
around five to ten minutes during the survey interview. Mothers’ parenting skills, 
as revealed by the tape, were rated by trained coders on dimensions such as 
intrusiveness, detachment, and positive regard. As above, we normalize the raw 
22 The variable is defined according to the primary mode of care. When parents use multiple 
modes of care, the primary type is the one used for the greatest number of hours.  
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scores on these parenting sub-scales to have a zero mean and a standard deviation 
of one. We also ran supplementary models using a number of maternal self-
reported measures (such as the frequency the child is read to and told stories). 
Finally, we examine longer-run financial and labor market consequences 
of the policies through models on a binary indicator for whether the mother was 
employed at the date of the age 4 survey and on the log of total gross household 
income measured at the same wave. 
Table 4 presents our results for a range of outcomes measured at the nine 
month survey, with the samples restricted to children who also participated in the 
preschool survey wave. The first three columns present findings for binary 
indicators of the main mode of child care. The estimates in column 1 mirror our 
findings for work participation. Children of eligible mothers are significantly less 
likely to be cared for solely by their parents in states with leave laws or high child 
care subsidies, and more likely to experience parent-only care where there are 
long welfare work exemptions. Moreover, magnitudes of the point estimates are 
virtually identical to (but opposite in sign from) the changes in work participation 
shown in Table 2, indicating that there is virtually a one-to-one offsetting 
relationship between maternal work and parent-only child care. Interestingly, the 
mode of non-parental care chosen by mothers induced to work differs strongly 
across policies. As shown in columns 2 and 3, mothers encouraged to work by 
state leave laws or welfare work requirements appear overwhelmingly to use 
informal non-center-based care providers, with no discernible increase in formal 
center-based care. Conversely, maternal participation increases induced by higher 
child care subsidies are associated with marginally greater use of center-based but 
not informal care, which makes sense given that some informal care arrangements 
are not eligible for subsidy. The increase in center care is small in absolute terms 
(2.8 percentage points) but represents a 33% increase in enrollment relative to the 
base enrollment rate (8.5% for children this age).23 These differing responses may 
lead to heterogeneous effects if, for example, center-based care tends to be of 
higher quality than other modes. 
23 Previous research (Magnuson, Meyers and Waldfogel 2007) also indicates that child care 
subsidies increase attendance of low-income children in formal care. That study, focused on 3 and 
4 year old children, found that an increase in subsidy spending of $1,000 per child in the state was 
associated with an 18 percentage point increase in enrollment in center care (a 44% increase 
relative to the base enrollment rate of 41% in their sample of 3 and 4 year olds).  
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Table 4. Regression models of intermediate factors nine months after birth 
Mode of child care at 9 months 
(4) 
Duration of 
breast feeding 
(months)
(5) 
< 4 well baby 
visits (binary)
(6) 
CES-D Maternal 
depression score
(z-score) 
(7) 
NCATS Maternal 
parenting score 
(z-score)
(1) 
Parent only 
(2) 
Center-based 
(3) 
Non-center based
    
State leave law × -0.045* -0.000 0.046* 0.183 -0.042** 0.102 -0.057 
Worked before birth (0.025) (0.017) (0.027) (0.211) (0.019) (0.062) (0.080) 
[-0.096, 0.005] [-0.033, 0.033] [-0.008, 0.100] [-0.236, 0.601] [-0.080, -0.004] [-0.022, 0.215] [-0.216, 0.102] 
     
Work exemption × 0.075** 0.008 -0.084*** -0.305 0.006 -0.018 -0.098 
Single mother (0.033) (0.024) (0.027) (0.253) (0.024) (0.103) (0.076) 
[0.010, 0.140] [-0.039, 0.056] [-0.138, -0.029] [-0.807, 0.198] [-0.042, 0.054] [-0.223, 0.187] [-0.249, 0.053] 
     
CCDF spending × -0.030* 0.028* 0.002 0.117 -0.008 0.010 0.059 
No parent with HS (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.172) (0.018) (0.071) (0.044) 
[-0.061, 0.001] [-0.003, 0.059] [-0.035, 0.040] [-0.225, 0.459] [-0.044, 0.027] [-0.131, 0.152] [-0.029, 0.147] 
     
R-squared 0.160 0.059 0.120 0.259 0.052 0.110 0.153 
Mean [SD] of dep  
var 
0.498 0.085 0.418 3.603 
[3.593] 
0.130 -0.005 
[1.003] 
0.023 
[0.999] 
Notes: Weighted estimates. Standard errors clustered for complex sampling design in parentheses. 95% confidence intervals in square brackets. *** p<.01, 
** p<.05, *p<.1. All regressions include state dummies, main effects of eligibility criteria (worked before birth, single mother and no parent with a high 
school diploma), plus the controls listed in the note of Table 2. Samples are limited to those children participating in the preschool (age 4) survey wave.  
Sample size is 8900 in columns (1) through (3) and 8800, 8850, 7900 and 7300 in columns (4) through (7). 
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We find no evidence that any of the policies affected the duration of breast 
feeding (see column 4). The associated coeffieients are not statistically significant 
and, on the basis of the confidence intervals (shown in the Table), we can rule out 
large positive effects on breast-feeding.  For example, we can exclude increases 
larger than .6 months in the duration of breast-feeding associated with the state 
parental leave laws. The lack of effects on breast-feeding is surprising given the 
association usually found between maternal time at home and breast-feeding.  For 
example, Baker and Milligan’s (2008) estimates indicated that each one month 
increase in leave was associated with 1/3 month increase in breast-feeding 
duration among eligible women. Being able to rule out effects larger than .6 
months, in our data, is consistent with the relatively brief additional leave 
provided to the average woman by state leave laws in the U.S, given that the 
typical state law covers relatively few additional women and/or extends the 
federal leave period by just a few weeks.25   
Column 5 examines the probability that a child participated in fewer than 
four well-baby visits. Eligible mothers in leave states were a statistically 
significant 4.2 percentage points less likely to fall below this threshold than 
equivalent mothers in non-leave states, consistent with parental leave providing 
parents with more time for important health-related investments in their infants, 
particularly in the first few months of life when the schedule of visits is most 
intensive. No corresponding effects are observed for welfare work exemptions or 
child care subsidies, perhaps because these policies affect employment slightly 
later in the first year when visits are less intensive.  
Column 6 examines normalized scores on the CES-D scale. None of the 
estimated policy effects on maternal depression are significant, and the 
confidence intervals allow us to rule out meaningful effects. Even for parental 
leave laws, where the point estimate is suggestive of an increase in depressive 
symptoms, we can rule out an effect larger than .215 standard deviations. Column 
7 shows results for the NCATS parenting score. Again, the estimated policy 
effects are statistically insignificant and they are sufficiently precise to exclude 
economically meaningful effects.26 These results are similar to those obtained by 
Baker and Milligan (2008 and 2010a), who found respectively that increases in 
parental employment associated with leave laws were not accompanied by 
changes in maternal mental health or parenting shortly after the birth.  
25 Our analysis of alternative breast feeding indicators similarly failed to reveal evidence of policy 
effects.  This is consistent with the low correlation (0.083), in our data, between months until work 
and months of breast feeding (with both outcomes censored at nine months).   
26 Additional analyses of mother-reported parenting variables such as frequency of reading to the 
child (available on request) revealed no policy effects that were significant or moderate in size. 
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Table 5. Regression models of intermediate factors approx. four after birth 
Mode of child care at 4 years   
(1) 
Mother 
employed at 
survey date 
(2) 
Parent only 
(3) 
Center-based 
(4) 
Non-center 
based 
(5) 
CES-D maternal 
depression score 
(z-score)
(6) 
Two Bags 
maternal 
parenting score 
(z-score) 
(7) 
Log household 
income at 
survey
  
State leave law × 0.053* 0.008 -0.018 0.010 0.084 -0.048 0.066 
Worked before birth (0.029) (0.030) (0.034) (0.025) (0.061) (0.074) (0.052) 
[-0.005, 0.111] [-0.051, 0.067] [-0.085, 0.048] [-0.040, 0.060] [-0.036, 0.205] [-0.195, 0.100] [-0.038, 0.171]
  
Work exemption × -0.032 0.026 -0.010 -0.016 -0.034 0.104 0.019 
Single mother (0.031) (0.028) (0.038) (0.032) (0.084) (0.081) (0.053) 
[-0.094, 0.029] [-0.030, 0.082] [-0.085, 0.066] [-0.080, 0.047] [-0.201, 0.133] [-0.057, 0.264] [-0.087, 0.125]
  
CCDF spending × 0.031 -0.021 0.021 -0.000 0.006 0.096** -0.055 
No parent with HS (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.028) (0.057) (0.045) (0.048) 
[-0.011, 0.072] [-0.060, 0.019] [-0.026, 0.068] [-0.057, 0.056] [-0.107, 0.118] [0.006, 0.186] [-0.151, 0.041]
  
Observations 8850 8850 8850 8850 8900 7600 8900 
R-squared 0.137 0.089 0.085 0.054 0.494 0.169 0.494 
Mean [SD] of dep var 0.601 0.195 0.580 0.225 0.000 
[1.001] 
-0.001 
[1.001] 
3.728 
[1.030] 
See notes to Table 4.
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Table 5 skips ahead three years to intermediate outcomes at the time of the 
preschool survey, when children are roughly age four. Column 1 examines 
maternal employment status. The positive effects of state leave laws on 
employment at nine months appear sustained in the longer term – eligible mothers 
are 5.3 percentage points (a 9% increase relative to the sample mean) more likely 
to be employed at the preschool survey in leave states than non-leave states, 
consistent with leave laws promoting job continuity in ways that have lasting 
effects (consistent with cross-country results obtained by Ruhm, 1998). Lengthy 
welfare work exemptions and child care subsidies, which respectively reduced 
and increased employment at 9 months, have smaller and no longer significant 
effects on employment at 4 years. Together these results suggest that leave 
policies affecting mothers of newborns have lasting effects on maternal 
employment, but that effects of early welfare work exemptions and child care 
subsidies attenuate over time.28  
The policy effects on child care mode, shown in columns 2 to 4, are also 
attenuated. In part this reflects age-related changes in care arrangements. By the 
age of four, 58% of children are in center-based care, compared with only 9% at 
nine months, while the proportion cared for solely by parents falls from 50% to 
20%.  
With regard to maternal depression, shown in column 5, again the point 
estimate for state leave laws, while not statistically significant, is suggestive of an 
increase in depression, although we can rule out an effect larger than .205 
standard deviation.  The results in column 6 indicate that child care subsidies are 
associated with significantly higher parenting quality (and the point estimate for 
welfare work exemptions is also positive, with a confidence interval that includes 
an effect of up to .264 standard deviations). 
The final column of Table 5 assesses the long-term income consequences 
of our three focal policies. None has a significant effect on household income four 
years post-birth, although the confidence interval for parental leave laws includes 
up to a 17.1% increase in household income. Whether such a change would be 
large enough to affect child outcomes remains to be seen, although this possibility 
is worth investigating since some research suggests that positive effects of 
maternal employment on children occur through the reduced financial stress and 
greater purchased inputs associated with maternal earnings (Brooks-Gunn et al., 
2010). 
  
28 We also estimated models of maternal employment status at the age two survey wave, and 
found results that were broadly consistent with findings from the preschool wave.  
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8. Child outcomes  
The high quality of the available measures of children’s cognitive ability and 
behavior problems is one advantage of the ECLS-B data. The Language, Literacy 
and Mathematics assessments were developed specifically for the study. The 
Language measure assesses verbal ability and spoken vocabulary; the Literacy 
assessment taps abilities such as letter recognition, letter sounds, recognition of 
simple words, and phonological awareness; and the Mathematics appraisal 
captures number sense, geometry, counting, operations, and patterns. Behavior 
problem scores are derived from maternal responses to 24 statements about the 
child’s behavior (many drawn from the Preschool and Kindergarten Behavioral 
Scales – Second Edition (PKBS-2)). Items are scored from 0 to 4, with higher 
scores indicating more problematic behavior; the overall score is the average of 
the 24 items (alpha = 0.86). The Conduct Problems score averages across a sub-
set of five items relating to anti-social and aggressive behaviors, and the 
Inattention score is the average of  five items relating to impulsivity and the 
ability to concentrate (alphas = 0.76 and 0.70 respectively). The cognitive and 
behavior scores are standardized to mean zero and standard deviation one, using 
the survey weights. 
Table 6 shows that we find no significant effects of our focal policies on 
the cognitive or behavioral outcomes.  However, several intriguing patterns 
emerge. First, state leave laws are uniformly associated with lower cognitive 
scores and more behavioral problems. We can rule out large negative effects on 
cognitive scores (the lower bound estimates for language, literacy, and math are 
.167, .183, and .130 standard deviations respectively) and behavioral problems 
(the upper bound estimates are .231, .191, and .179 for overall behavior problems, 
conduct problems, and inattention problems) but  nevertheless this pattern of 
results makes it difficult to justify these laws on the basis of improvements in 
child outcomes (although there certainly could be other benefits to children or 
adults).We can only speculate as to the reason for this pattern of results, which 
future research should explore. Under the assumption that children benefit from 
greater maternal time in the first year, these results raise the possibility that the 
positive impacts of greater leave-taking in the first months after a birth might be 
offset by negative consequences of employment increases observed later in the 
first year.  In addition, leave policies have potentially heterogeneous effects on 
different groups of women and whether they benefit or harm children likely 
depends on which specific women are affected. Second, lengthy welfare work 
exemptions have indeterminate effects on the cognitive scores but might be 
associated with fewer problem behaviors (the confidence intervals indicate that 
increases in behavior problems are unlikely to be larger than .09 standard 
deviation and that decreases might be as large as .25 standard deviations), raising 
possible concern about the consequences for children of reducing the length of 
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work exemptions under welfare reform.  Finally, more generous child care 
subsidies do not have meaningful effects on either cognitive scores or behavior 
problems (we can rule out an increase of more than .06 standard deviations in 
behavior problems, and a decrease of more than .075 in cognitive scores). This 
result is reassuring given prior findings in the U.S. (Herbst and Tekin, 2010, in 
press) and Canada (Baker, Gruber, and Milligan, 2008) linking child care 
subsidies with poorer outcomes for children.  
9. Robustness checks 
The estimates of the effects of the policies on early work participation in Table 2 
appear plausible as causal effects in terms of their magnitudes, patterns, and 
direction, and perhaps provide the strongest evidence in favor of our research 
design. The results of a series of robustness checks, summarized next, allow us to 
be more confident in our interpretation.  
 Mothers about to become pregnant for the second (or later) time might be 
more likely to work in states with a leave law than in those without (because leave 
entitlements increase job continuity), implying differences in the treatment groups 
across states with and without leave laws. This was addressed above by including 
controls for child parity.  As a further check, we estimated models on the sub-
sample of mothers having first births only, since pre-birth employment of first-
time mothers is unlikely to be much affected by the presence of a leave law. The 
state leave law effects on early work participation have the same pattern as our 
preferred estimates, with negative coefficients at two months post-birth becoming 
positive by nine months. In terms of the intermediate outcomes, the leave law 
coefficients remain insignificant as in the full sample, with the exception that the 
positive association with well baby visits holds also for first births. The sign of 
the effects on parenting quality at nine months and at four years reverses to 
become positive, however, raising the possibility that the negative effects found in 
the full sample may reflect unobserved heterogeneity among women having a 
second birth or more. As before, the effects of leave laws on child outcomes are 
small and insignificant in the first birth sample, with the exception of a single 
negative coefficient on math scores that becomes marginally significant at the 
10% level. 
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Table 6. Regression models of child outcomes at preschool survey  
(1) 
Language z-score 
(2) 
Literacy z-score 
(3) 
Math z-score 
(4) 
Overall behavior 
problems z-score 
(5) 
Conduct behavior 
problems z-score 
(6) 
Inattention behavior 
problems z-score 
  
State leave law × -0.042 -0.060 -0.019 0.086 0.054 0.068 
Worked before birth (0.063) (0.062) (0.056) (0.073) (0.069) (0.056) 
[-0.167, 0.083] [-0.183, 0.063] [-0.130, 0.093] [-0.059, 0.231] [-0.082, 0.191] [-0.043, 0.179] 
  
Work exemption × -0.039 -0.001 0.024 -0.059 -0.035 -0.100 
Single mother (0.067) (0.058) (0.064) (0.077) (0.065) (0.077) 
[-0.173, 0.094] [-0.116, 0.113] [-0.102, 0.151] [-0.212, 0.093] [-0.164, 0.094] [-0.253, 0.052] 
  
CCDF spending × 0.011 0.024 0.055 -0.071 -0.064 -0.052 
No parent with HS (0.043) (0.044) (0.053) (0.063) (0.061) (0.055) 
[-0.075, 0.096] [-0.063, 0.111] [-0.050, 0.160] [-0.196, 0.054] [-0.185, 0.057] [-0.161, 0.057] 
  
R-squared 0.302 0.249 0.234 0.107 0.092 0.107 
Mean [SD] of dep var 
0.001 
[1.001] 
0.002 
[1.001] 
0.003 
[0.999] 
-0.003 
[0.996] 
-0.003 
[0.997] 
-0.003 
[0.999] 
Notes. Weighted estimates. Standard errors clustered for complex sampling design in parentheses. 95% confidence intervals in square brackets. *** p<.01, 
** p<.05, *p<.1. All regressions include state dummies, main effects of eligibility criteria (worked before birth, single mother and no parent with a high 
school diploma), plus the controls listed in the note to Table 2.  Sample size is 8400, 8200, 8250, 8900, 8850 and 8850 in columns (1) through (6).
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We estimated models for sub-samples of mothers aged 25 or over, with 
some college or more, and for married mothers.29 Restricting the sample to those 
25 or over removes young low-educated mothers who may use child care 
subsidies to release time for education rather than work.  Consistent with this, 
child care subsidies have stronger and more significant effects on work 
participation and care mode for the older subsample at all three dates in the nine 
month post-birth period, and these effects remain significant even at the age 4 
survey.   
Other research (Han, Ruhm and Waldfogel 2009) shows that advantaged 
mothers are more likely than their counterparts to be able to use the unpaid 
maternity leaves provided by most state laws. Our results support this.  Compared 
with the full sample 6.6 percentage point reduction in the probability of work by 
two months associated with a state leave law, the estimated decreases are 7.8 
points for  married mothers and 11.3 points among the college educated (both 
significant at the 1% level). The predicted effects on work by nine months are 
positive for both groups, and of similar magnitude to the 4.3 percentage point 
estimate from the full sample, although not significant (because of reduced 
sample sizes).  We find little evidence of larger effects among the advantaged 
groups for other outcomes although the estimated consequences of leave laws on 
maternal depression at nine months are significantly negative for married mothers.      
We examined whether the DD estimates above reflect the influence of 
correlated state conditions by including four sets of additional controls: the state 
unemployment rate and the percent of workers covered by a union; census region; 
democratic party representation in state politics; and transfer program provisions 
(non-refundable or refundable Child and Dependent Care (CADC) tax credits, 
refundable state Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC), and generosity of Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Food Stamp benefits (for a family of 
three). In each case, these variables were interacted with the eligibility indicators 
for the three focal policies.  The results are generally insensitive to these 
supplementary controls.  The biggest change occurred on the estimated effects of 
state leave laws when other transfer program provisions were allowed to drive 
differences in outcomes between treatment and control individuals. Although the 
negative effect of leave laws on work by two months remained, the positive 
employment effect at nine months or more disappeared and the association of 
leave laws with child outcomes became uniformly beneficial (but not statistically 
significant). This raises the possibility that leave laws reduce participation in the 
very early post-birth period in ways that are beneficial for children but they tend 
29 Not all policy effects can be estimated for all sub-samples due to a dropping of entire eligible or 
control groups. 
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to be confounded with other state policies increasing employment in the longer 
term and with less positive impacts on children’s development. 
10. Discussion 
This paper considers how three types of public policies that potentially influence 
the work and child care decisions of mothers with infants – parental leave laws, 
welfare work exemptions, and child care subsidies  – affect the timing of work 
participation after birth, and a range of intermediate and child outcomes during 
the subsequent four years. The policies affect early maternal work participation, in 
ways that would be expected given the incentives they provide and collectively 
they strongly influence patterns of work by mothers after birth.  However, we do 
not obtain evidence of significant consequences for child well-being.   
Our results for parental leave policies are consistent with the findings of 
recent research for Canada (Baker and Milligan, 2008, 2010a and b), Germany 
(Dustmann Schönberg, 2008), Denmark (Rasmussen, 2010), and Sweden (Liu and 
Skans, 2010) that fail to uncover beneficial effects of parental leave expansions 
for child outcomes, or find only selective effects. In particular, our findings echo 
those of Baker and Milligan (2010b) who find no significant effects of parental 
leave extensions on child developmental outcomes at preschool in spite of 
significant effects of such policies on maternal leave-taking and breast-feeding in 
the first year of life. This congruence of results is interesting given how markedly 
Canadian parental leave policies differ from those in the U.S.  Prior to the 
extension of job-protected leave Canadian mothers already remained at home for 
an average of six months after birth, with the policy reform inducing an increase 
in this duration to nine months. Such effects might be quite different from those of 
U.S. state leave laws, which generally extend time at home in the first few months 
after a birth. To the extent that maternal employment early in the first year is most 
consequential for development (see e.g. Brooks-Gunn et al., 2010), U.S. laws 
might be expected to have a larger effect on child outcomes.  However, such 
effects may be muted because U.S. policies mainly provide unpaid leave (in 
contrast to paid leave in Canada). 
Our findings for the welfare work exemptions are more novel, given the 
limited prior research on them, but are consistent with expectations. Women 
exempted from welfare work requirements are less likely to work during the 
period of exemption. But again, developmental benefits are not apparent. Finally, 
with regard to child care subsidies, we find that greater subsidy spending is 
associated with higher rates of employment and use of center-based care, 
consistent with research on families with older children, but with no apparent 
developmental benefit or harm to the children. This latter result stands in contrast 
to prior research on child care subsidies which has tended to find negative effects 
on child outcomes. But prior studies are not readily comparable. For instance, the 
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Quebec preschool program analyzed by Baker et al. (2008) was universal, single 
mothers were excluded from their analysis and, as they recognize, their study may 
partly be capturing short-run adjustments to changes in family circumstances. In 
contrast, the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) examined here is a long-
running child care subsidy program targeted only to low-income families, many 
of whom are female-headed. Moreover, the U.S. subsidy program we examined 
seems to have mostly moved children into center-based care, which in the U.S. 
context is often of higher quality than the informal care alternatives families 
might otherwise use.   
That said, several caveats should be kept in mind when interpreting our 
results.  First, although the rich data, and large, nationally representative sample 
available to us, allowed us to be confident in ruling out large consequences of 
these policies for child well-being, we can be less confident about our ability to 
detect smaller effects.  For example, in subgroup analyses, the point estimates 
consistently indicate that child care subsidies have positive cognitive and 
behavioral effects for four-year old children of less educated parents, but with the 
reduced sample size for that subgroup, none of the parameters approaches 
statistical significance. Second, it seems possible that the policies implemented in 
the United States (brief unpaid parental leaves, child care subsidies that are 
limited to a portion of low-income families, and welfare work exemptions that 
affect relatively few women) may not be strong enough to induce sizable changes 
in child well-being, while leaving open the possibility that more expansive 
policies might have large impacts.  Third, we are not able to identify the specific 
eligibility of individuals in our data for the policies.  This may generally lead to 
an understatement of the treatment effects, with supporting evidence recently 
provided, in a European context, by Carneiro et al. (2010) who show that the 
long-term benefits of Norwegian parental leave expansions are underestimated 
when ineligible children are included in the analysis.  Finally, we are not able to 
examine long-run outcomes (e.g. completed education, labor market outcomes, 
adult psychological well-being), and it remains possible that the short-run and 
medium-term measures that we focus upon are less than fully informative in this 
regard.  In addition, the policies could yield other benefits or costs (such as effects 
on the labor market situation of mothers) that are not focused upon here.  
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Appendix Table A1. Full details of state leave policies 
State State leave law provisions Welfare work 
exemptions 
(mths) 
CCDF 
spending ($) 
Alabama - 3 1183 
Alaska - 12 2776 
Arizona - none 961 
Arkansas - 3 743 
California TDI 3 1537 
Colorado - 12 1513 
Connecticut Max leave 16 weeks, min req 
hours 20 
12 4938 
Delaware - 3 3895 
District of Columbia Max leave 16 weeks, min req 
hours 20, no firm size req 
12 3864 
Florida - 3 1530 
Georgia - 12 1345 
Hawaii TDI, 6 mths min tenure, no min 
hours req 
6 2355 
Idaho - none 1391 
Illinois - 12 2203 
Indiana - 3 1795 
Iowa - 3 2954 
Kansas - 12 1745 
Kentucky - 12 1031 
Louisiana - 12 1188 
Maine No min hours req, min req firm 
size 15 
12 2005 
Maryland - 12 2452 
Massachusetts No min tenure, no min hours req, 
no firm size req 
24 3300 
Michigan - 3 746 
Minnesota No min tenure, min req hours 20, 
min req firm size 15 
12 2967 
Mississippi - 12 973 
Missouri - 12 1690 
Montana No min tenure, no min hours req, 
no firm size req 
none 1888 
Nebraska - 3 3913 
Nevada - 12 874 
New Hampshire - 24 4181 
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State State leave law provisions Welfare work 
exemptions 
(mths) 
CCDF 
spending ($) 
New Jersey TDI, min req hours 20 3 3201 
New Mexico - 12 1180 
New York TDI 3 2098 
North Carolina - 12 2178 
North Dakota - 4 1336 
Ohio - 12 2144 
Oklahoma - 3 1465 
Oregon Max leave 24 weeks, 6 mths min 
tenure, no min hours req, min req 
firm size 25 
3 1061 
Pennsylvania - 12 1875 
Rhode Island TDI, max leave 13 weeks 12 4515 
South Carolina - 12 974 
South Dakota - 3 1357 
Tennessee Max leave 17 weeks, no firm size 
req 
4 1719 
Texas - 12 976 
Utah - none 1168 
Vermont Min req firm size 10 24 3392 
Virginia - 18 1862 
Washington - 4 2890 
West Virginia - 12 1336 
Wisconsin Min req hours 20 3 2646 
Wyoming - 3 1336 
Notes. The Federal FMLA applies in all states and provides for 12 weeks of unpaid leave to 
employees working at least 25 hours per week in the previous year for firms with 50 or more 
employees. The entries in the table note whether the state leave law relaxes the maximum leave 
period, the minimum tenure period, the minimum weekly hours requirement or the minimum firm 
size requirement for qualification. In addition states with Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) 
laws provide some period of paid parental leave. 
CCDF spending expressed as thousands of dollars per poor child under 6 in 2001 dollars.  
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Appendix Table A2. Eligible-control group differences by state leave laws 
Mean for eligible group 
(employed prebirth) – mean for 
control group (not employed 
prebirth) 
(1)  
States with a 
leave law 
(2) States 
without a leave 
law 
(1) and (2) 
sig diff? 
White non-Hispanic 0.170 0.122  
Black non-Hispanic 0.029 0.010  
Hispanic -0.187 -0.129 * 
Asian -0.013 -0.010  
Other race/ethnicity 0.002 0.007  
Single 0.007 -0.006  
No parent with high school -0.209 -0.165 * 
Mother: Less than high school -0.258 -0.197 ** 
Mother: High school 0.031 0.014  
Mother: Some college 0.097 0.117  
Mother: BA degree 0.051 0.047  
Mother: More than BA degree 0.078 0.018 *** 
Mother’s age 1.474 1.102  
No resident siblings at 9 months 0.100 0.141  
1 resident sibling at 9 months -0.008 -0.029  
More than 1 resident sibling at 9 months -0.091 -0.112  
Sibling under 3 in household at 9 months -0.073 -0.117 * 
Sibling age 3 or 4 in household at 9 mths -0.035 -0.058  
Mother foreign born -0.217 -0.143 ** 
Mother’s primary language non-English -0.135 -0.083 ** 
Urban cluster -0.010 -0.010  
Rural area 0.044 0.036  
Father: Less than high school -0.162 -0.098 *** 
Father: High school 0.004 0.022  
Father: Some college 0.075 0.053  
Father: BA degree 0.048 0.046  
Father: More than BA degree 0.028 -0.018 ** 
Mother received welfare in childhood -0.003 -0.002  
Mother’s mother some college or more 0.133 0.084 * 
Mother’s father some college or more 0.139 0.076 ** 
Mother’s family intact til 16 -0.005 -0.005  
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Mean for eligible group 
(employed prebirth) – mean for 
control group (not employed 
prebirth) 
(1)  
States with a 
leave law 
(2) States 
without a leave 
law 
(1) and (2) 
sig diff? 
0 risky life events ever happened -0.015 -0.011  
1 risky life event ever happened 0.002 -0.001  
2 to 6 risky life events ever happened 0.014 0.016  
Pre-pregnancy BMI: Under weight -0.028 -0.012  
Pre-pregnancy BMI: Normal -0.001 0.010  
Pre-pregnancy BMI: Over weight 0.041 0.014  
Pre-pregnancy BMI: Obese 0.028 0.007  
Ever smoked > 100 cigarettes 0.072 0.086  
Alcohol pre-pregnancy: Never -0.160 -0.171  
Alcohol pre-pregnancy: < 4 drinks pwk 0.110 0.131  
Alcohol pre-pregnancy: >=4 drinks pwk 0.049 0.040  
Ideal number of children in whole life -0.200 -0.240  
Child is female -0.023 0.007  
Birth weight normal (>2500g) -0.001 0.000  
Birth weight low (1500-2500g) 0.000 -0.002  
Birth weight very low (<1500g) 0.001 0.002  
Multiple birth 0.006 0.003  
Note. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Appendix Table A3. Eligible-control group differences by state welfare work 
exemptions 
Mean for eligible group (single 
mothers) – mean for control group 
(couple mothers) 
(1) States with 
exemption>=12 
mths 
(1) States with 
exemption<12 
mths 
(1) and (2) 
sig diff? 
White non-Hispanic -0.366 -0.270 ** 
Black non-Hispanic 0.405 0.277 *** 
Hispanic -0.023 0.008  
Asian -0.024 -0.029  
Other race/ethnicity 0.007 0.013  
Employed prebirth -0.001 -0.001  
No parent with high school 0.327 0.313  
Mother: Less than high school 0.240 0.203  
Mother: High school 0.102 0.071  
Mother: Some college -0.046 -0.056  
Mother: BA degree -0.183 -0.136 ** 
Mother: More than BA degree -0.113 -0.081 ** 
Mother’s age -5.026 -4.573  
No resident siblings at 9 months 0.099 0.176 ** 
1 resident sibling at 9 months -0.049 -0.128 ** 
More than 1 resident sibling at 9 months -0.050 -0.048  
Sibling under 3 in household at 9 months -0.002 -0.036  
Sibling age 3 or 4 in household at 9 mths -0.076 -0.069  
Mother foreign born -0.088 -0.104  
Mother’s primary language non-English -0.068 -0.052  
Urban cluster 0.025 -0.017  
Rural area -0.009 -0.012  
Father: Less than high school -0.212 -0.218  
Father: High school -0.224 -0.235  
Father: Some college -0.252 -0.269  
Father: BA degree -0.181 -0.162  
Father: More than BA degree -0.131 -0.116  
Mother received welfare in childhood 0.102 0.109  
Mother’s mother some college or more -0.112 -0.093  
Mother’s father some college or more -0.217 -0.159 ** 
Mother’s family intact til 16 -0.258 -0.219  
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Mean for eligible group (single 
mothers) – mean for control group 
(couple mothers) 
(1) States with 
exemption>=12 
mths 
(1) States with 
exemption<12 
mths 
(1) and (2) 
sig diff? 
0 risky life events ever happened -0.259 -0.216  
1 risky life event ever happened 0.139 0.142  
2 to 6 risky life events ever happened 0.12 0.077 ** 
Pre-pregnancy BMI: Under weight 0.021 0.036  
Pre-pregnancy BMI: Normal -0.047 0.005  
Pre-pregnancy BMI: Over weight -0.021 -0.059  
Pre-pregnancy BMI: Obese 0.046 0.021  
Ever smoked > 100 cigarettes 0.052 0.059  
Alcohol pre-pregnancy: Never 0.062 0.043  
Alcohol pre-pregnancy: < 4 drinks pwk -0.075 -0.062  
Alcohol pre-pregnancy: >=4 drinks pwk 0.013 0.017  
Ideal number of children in whole life -0.3 -0.223  
Child is female 0.047 -0.005  
Birth weight normal (>2500g) -0.029 -0.026  
Birth weight low (1500-2500g) 0.024 0.022  
Birth weight very low (<1500g) 0.005 0.005  
Multiple birth -0.009 -0.007  
Note. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Appendix Table A4. Eligible-control group differences by state CCDF 
spending 
Mean for eligible group 
(no parent with HS) – 
mean for control group 
(parent with HS or more) 
Tests for sig diff 
State CCDF spending: 
(1) 
> 
$2500 
(2) 
$1500
-2500 
(3) 
< 
$1500 
(1) 
vs 
(2) 
(2) 
vs 
(3) 
(1) 
vs 
(3) 
White non-Hispanic -0.426 -0.373 -0.353 
Black non-Hispanic 0.095 0.070 0.096 
Hispanic 0.314 0.337 0.278 
Asian -0.004 -0.033 -0.014 *** ***  
Other race/ethnicity 0.021 -0.001 -0.008 ** 
Single 0.410 0.305 0.316 * * 
Employed prebirth -0.235 -0.223 -0.252 
Mother: Less than high school 0.914 0.891 0.906 
Mother: High school -0.254 -0.256 -0.298 *  
Mother: Some college -0.283 -0.323 -0.362 ** *** 
Mother: BA degree -0.236 -0.188 -0.164 * ** 
Mother: More than BA degree -0.141 -0.123 -0.082 *** ** 
Mother’s age -5.410 -4.604 -4.358 
No resident siblings at 9 months 0.061 0.029 0.041 
1 resident sibling at 9 months -0.074 -0.113 -0.075 
More than 1 resident sibling at 9 months 0.013 0.084 0.034 
Sibling under 3 in household at 9 months 0.027 0.015 -0.012 
Sibling age 3 or 4 in household at 9 mths -0.089 -0.044 -0.005 ** 
Mother foreign born 0.248 0.244 0.230 
Mother’s primary language non-English 0.201 0.149 0.094 ** 
Urban cluster -0.018 0.019 -0.070 **  
Rural area -0.012 -0.008 -0.009 
Father: Less than high school 0.407 0.479 0.443 
Father: High school -0.236 -0.212 -0.247 *  
Father: Some college -0.235 -0.261 -0.276 ** 
Father: BA degree -0.197 -0.179 -0.141 ** ** 
Father: More than BA degree -0.148 -0.132 -0.094 *** ** 
Mother received welfare in childhood 0.102 0.075 0.066 
Mother’s mother some college or more -0.322 -0.304 -0.285 
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Mean for eligible group 
(no parent with HS) – 
mean for control group 
(parent with HS or more) 
Tests for sig diff 
State CCDF spending: 
(1) 
> 
$2500 
(2) 
$1500
-2500 
(3) 
< 
$1500 
(1) 
vs 
(2) 
(2) 
vs 
(3) 
(1) 
vs 
(3) 
Mother’s father some college or more -0.327 -0.323 -0.316 
Mother’s family intact til 16 -0.178 -0.161 -0.103 
0 risky life events ever happened -0.143 -0.074 -0.188 ***  
1 risky life event ever happened 0.069 0.023 0.106 **  
2 to 6 risky life events ever happened 0.050 0.046 0.072 
Pre-pregnancy BMI: Under weight 0.051 0.015 0.000 ** 
Pre-pregnancy BMI: Normal -0.043 -0.081 -0.018 
Pre-pregnancy BMI: Over weight -0.016 0.001 0.006 
Pre-pregnancy BMI: Obese -0.010 0.001 -0.006 
Ever smoked > 100 cigarettes -0.006 -0.013 0.013 
Alcohol pre-pregnancy: Never 0.267 0.196 0.147 ** 
Alcohol pre-pregnancy: < 4 drinks pwk -0.237 -0.181 -0.126 * ** 
Alcohol pre-pregnancy: >=4 drinks pwk -0.031 -0.017 -0.021 
Ideal number of children in whole life -0.225 0.059 -0.119 *** **  
Child is female 0.016 -0.001 0.024 
Birth weight normal (>2500g) -0.014 -0.006 -0.020 
Birth weight low (1500-2500g) 0.003 0.005 0.017 
Birth weight very low (<1500g) 0.011 0.001 0.003 *** * 
Multiple birth -0.024 -0.013 -0.004 ** *** 
Note. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, *p<.1. 
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Appendix Figure A1 
Appendix Figure A2 
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Appendix Figure A3 
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